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In this study, we estimate final demand for beverages with a particular focus on
alcoholic beverages and calculate elasticities using microdata from the Swiss
household expenditure survey from 2000 to 2009, which containsdata from more
than 34,000 households. We estimate price and income responses for three
household segments – light, moderate, and heavy drinking households – to assess
whether higher alcohol consumption could be described by different price and
income elasticities in comparison to lower alcohol consumption. We obtain
unconditional estimates by applying a two-stage budgeting quadratic almost ideal
demand system. To generate missing price data, we used the recently proposed
quality adjusted price approach. Due to a high share of zero consumption for some
beveragescategories,we correct the model with a two-step estimation procedure.
Estimation results show that heavy drinking households are much less price elastic
with respect to wine and beer in comparison to moderate or light drinking
households, while the price response for spirits is almost constant over the three
segments. Before implementing a new tax for alcoholic beverages in Switzerland, the
social, health, and economic effects of a rather small decrease in alcohol
consumption among heavy drinking households must be weighed against possible
negativeconsequences of a sharp decline in light or moderate drinking households.
Keywords: Demand alcoholic beverages; QUAIDS; Household segmentsIntroduction
Knowledge about the determinants of consumption of alcoholic beverages and the
price and income elasticity of different consumer segments is highly relevant to policy
decisions. Alcohol consumption is a public health priority. Following for example
Wakabayashi (2013) and Corrao et al. (2000), a regular but moderate consumption of
alcohol in general can have a positive effect on health by increasing the level of HDL
cholesterol and reducing the risk of heart and vascular diseases, though other studies
do not report positive health effects of low or moderate alcohol consumption (Estruch
et al. 2014, WHO 2007). The discussion is complex and still ongoing. However, there
is consensus that excessive alcohol consumption can be detrimental to health in that it
can lead to liver cancer, liver disease, higher blood pressure, stroke, or mental decline2014 Aepli; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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consumption can also have negative psychological and behavioral consequences. It can
lead to higher rates of crime or violence (Jacobs and Steyn 2013; Fergusson et al. 2013)
and have negative economic effects, leading to substantial higher state costs
(Sacks et al. 2013).
Policy measures have been shown to reduce alcohol consumption and to be a cost
effective health care intervention (Xuan et al. 2013; Doran et al. 2013). Nevertheless,
alcohol taxation and its effectiveness is still a controversial discussion point in
Switzerland and other European countries (for an overview of the different alcohol
policy regulations in Europe see e.g., FOPH, 2014a). While total alcohol consumption
in Switzerland has been decreasing slightly since 1990, with a current per capita
consumption of about 8.5 liters of pure alcohol per year (SAB 2013), excessive forms of
alcohol drinking like binge drinking have been increasing, especially among young
people (FOPH 2013; Annaheim and Gmel 2004). Therefore, Switzerland is currently
debating a tightening of alcohol legislation. While wine is excluded from the alcohol
tax, beer and spirits are heavily taxed. The current legislation has the purpose of a posi-
tive health effect on one hand and a fiscal benefit on the other, with annual tax revenue
of about 440 million Swiss francs (FDF 2009).
In order to assess the effect of a new tax on consumption, especially in the case of
heavy drinkers, the estimation of price elasticities is crucial. However, price policies
may be superfluous if changing income level affects consumption (Aepli and Finger
2013; Gallet 2010). Therefore, an estimation of income elasticities as a supplement to
price elasticities is necessary. An additional tax burden to reduce light or moderate
drinkers’ consumption levels may not be desirable with respect not only to social
aspects but also concerning health effects, depending on which assumptions are made
with respect to the health effects of low or moderate alcohol consumption. In the case
of heavy drinkers it is clear that a reduction in consumption would reduce public
health costs and decrease social problems. To address the question of how price and
income affect demand for alcoholic beverages in Switzerland, we estimate final demand
price and income elasticities separately for light, moderate, and heavy drinking
households based on a repeated cross-sectional household expenditure survey. We
combine several recently used methods into one demand system, expecting that
price and income responses are not constant among the three segments.
Switzerland is a particularly interesting case due to its comparatively high purchasing
power. Findings from the Swiss case can also be transferred to a considerable extent to
other European countries.
Elasticity estimates based on household data are scarce. Most studies rely on time-
series data (Gallet 2007), which limits the ability to estimate elasticities for different
household segments. Furthermore, most studies did not investigate possible substitution
effects between alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. Our study contributes to filling
this gap and allows a more detailed understanding of alcohol demand with respect to the
demand response of different household segments.
We apply a two-stage quadratic almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS) (Banks et al.
1997 [for application see e.g., Abdulai 2002; Jithitikulchai 2011]). It uses cross-sectional
data from the Swiss household expenditure survey from 2000 to 2009, which contains
data from more than 34,000 households. Final demand elasticities are estimated for
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spirits, and several non-alcoholic beverages at the second stage. Due to a high zero
consumption for some product groups, we modified the QUAIDS using Shonkwiler
and Yen’s approach (1999) (for application see e.g., Thiele 2008; Tafere et al. 2010) and
corrected for possible heteroscedasticity by applying a parametric bootstrap. We
received missing price data by using the method recently proposed by Majumder et al.
(2012), further developed by Aepli and Finger (2013), and by introducing a variable for
seasonality and trend applied by Aepli and Kuhlgatz (2014) for the same expenditure
survey. Furthermore, we corrected for endogeneity of the expenditure variable in the
model by using the augmented regression technique.
Heeb et al. (2003) analyzed the effect in Switzerland of a price reduction on spirits in
1999. The reduction was due to a tariff reduction under the WTO agreement and they
focused on heavy drinkers using a longitudinal survey. Overall, spirits are rated as
inelastic, whereas low volume drinkers are more elastic than high volume drinkers are.
This would mean that taxes should reduce light or moderate drinkers’ level of
consumption more than the heavy drinkers’ levels (Manning et al. 1995). Kuo et al.
(2003) used the same period as Heeb et al. (2003) with the price reduction due to the
WTO agreement to estimate demand reaction to the price decrease. They found that
young people in particular responded with higher demand, whereas people aged 60 or
older did not respond at all to the price change.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section Theoretical framework and two-stage
budgeting, we describe the theoretical framework and the two-stage budgeting system,
and in Section Data description and price computation, we present the descriptive
statistics and indicate how price data are generated. Section Estimation procedure and
elasticity calculation summarizes the estimation procedure and the elasticity calculation.
The income and price responses are discussed in Section Results and discussion, while
Section Conclusions and policy implications concludes.
Background
Theoretical framework and two-stage budgeting
Theoretical framework of the QUAIDS
Equation systems have been widely used in demand analysis. The most frequently
applied models are: the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) or the linearized AIDS
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a, 1980b; Akbay et al. 2007; Mhurchu et al. 2013); the
quadratic version of the AIDS (QUAIDS) (Banks et al. 1997; Abdulai 2002; Dey et al.
2011; see Stasi et al. 2010 and Cembalo et al. 2014 for wine in particular); the
Rotterdam model (Barten 1964; Theil 1965; Barnett and Seck 2008; Barnett and
Kanyama 2013); the Translog (Christensen et al. 1975; Holt and Goodwin 2009); and
the linear and quadratic expenditure systems (Pollak and Wales 1978; De Boer and
Paap 2009). One of the most important criteria is the approximation of non-linear
Engel curves, which is best satisfied by the QUAIDS and allows general income
responses that are not captured by the AIDS or many other models. The QUAIDS
model is a rank three demand system and satisfies the axioms of choice. It allows exact
aggregation over consumers due to underlying preferences that are of the generalized
Gorman polar form (Banks et al. 1997; Blackorby et al. 1978). The recently proposed
EASI demand system (Lewbel and Pendakur 2009; for application see e.g., Stasi et al.
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mation of Engel curves. But Cranfield et al. (2003) noted that the QUAIDS is especially
suitable in the case of a disaggregated analysis, as in this study. Furthermore, the
QUAIDS has already been successfully applied to the Swiss household expenditure
survey (see e.g., Abdulai 2002).
Following Banks et al. (1997) the indirect utility function of the QUAIDS is given by:
lnV ¼ logm− loga pð Þ
b pð Þ
 −1
þ λ pð Þ
 !−1
ð1Þ
where m is total expenditure and p are prices, a(p) is the translog price aggregator, and
b(p) is the Cobb-Douglas price aggregator. The term logm− loga pð Þb pð Þ is the indirect utility
function of a PIGLOG demand system and λ(p) is a differentiable, homogeneous
function of degree zero of prices. a(p) and b(p) are defined as follows:
a pð Þ ¼ α0 þ
Xn
i¼1







γij logpi logpj ð2Þ




where i and j are specific goods and n is the number of goods.
The Marshallian demand function in budget shares is obtained by applying Roy’s
identity to the indirect utility function:
wi ¼ αi þ
Xn
j¼1










where wi is the budget share for product category i, and α0, αi, γij, βi and λi are parame-
ters to be estimated. The residuals εi are assumed to be multivariate normal distributed
with zero mean and a finite variance-covariance matrix.
To meet utility maximization theory, the restriction of adding-up (5), of homogeneity
of the Marshallian cost function in prices and total expenditure (6), and of symmetry of

















γij ¼ 0 ð6Þ
Symmetry: γ ij ¼ γ ji ð7Þ
Theoretical restrictions allow us to reduce the number of estimated parameters as
well as improve the efficiency of the estimated model (Barnett and Seck 2008). To
avoid singularity in the variance-covariance matrix and to satisfy the condition of
adding-up, one equation is dropped and an n-1 equation system is estimated. The
parameters of the n th equation are obtained from the restriction and the parameters
of the n-1 equations.
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variable for seasonality and time trend into account using the demographic translation
approach by Pollak and Wales (1978) (applied e.g., by Abdulai 2002; Bopape and
Myers 2007), modifying the intercept α0 in equation (4) to




Where df is the fth variable of a total number of S variables including household
characteristics and a variable for month and year.
Two-stage budgeting design
To obtain unconditional elasticities for alcoholic beverages, which are more suitable for
policy recommendations than conditional elasticities (Abdulai 2002, Klonaris and
Hallam 2003), we adopt a two-stage budgeting system, assuming separability of the util-
ity function (for further explanations see e.g., Moschini et al. 1994 or Brehe 2007)a.
First, we assume that the household allocates its budget on the three aggregated prod-
uct groups at stage 1: food, beverages, and other products and services. At stage 2, the
total expenditure for beverages is allocated to the disaggregated product categories:
wine, beer, spirits, coffee, tea, cocoa beverages, mineral water, non-alcoholic soft drinks,
and fruit and vegetables juices. We estimate income and price response at both stages,
while the elasticity at stage 2 is conditional with respect to total expenditure for
beverages. Unconditional elasticities for stage 2 could be obtained using the elasticity
estimates at stage 1 (see Section Elasticity estimates).
Method and data
Data description and price computation
Summary statistics and definition of the household segments
For our study, we used data collected by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office from 2000
to 2009 for the Swiss household expenditure survey , a national representative survey
that consists of cross-sectional data with a periodicity of one month. Almost 3,000
households participate in the survey every year. We can base our estimates on more
than 34,000 households over a period of 10 years. Households are chosen randomly
from the register or private telephone lines (see SFSO 2011 for details). The sample is
stratified with respect to the seven major regions in Switzerland and the distribution of
households is calibrated to the distribution of households in the Swiss population
(SFSO 2011). For every household, data on expenditure and quantity bought (in liters
per month) for all products and services, household income, and detailed information
on household characteristics were gathered. To increase the explanatory power of the
model and to test whether household characteristics have an influence on alcohol
demand, we introduced the following criteria into the model: household size in terms
of adult equivalents, a dummy variable for the presence of young children (<5 years),
the age of the household’s reference person, and a dummy variable for whether the
household’s reference person has a university degree. Household size is calculated
following the OECD-modified equivalence scale (Hagenaars et al. 1994). Following
Angulo et al. (2001) we expect a decreasing expenditure share as the number of equivalence
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and the presence of young children there are either contradictory or no clear findings in the
literature (see e.g., Van Oers et al. 1999; Reavley et al. 2011; Rice et al. 1998).
The sample is divided into three segments: light drinking households, moderate
drinking households, and heavy drinking households. We provide elasticities for the
entire sample as well as for the three household segments. The classification is
constructed based on the recommendations for Switzerland in Annaheim and Gmel
(2004). These are the official recommendations for Switzerland from the Swiss Institute
for the Prevention of Alcohol and Drug Problems. Table 1 summarizes the class boundaries
in pure alcohol per person and day.
According to FOPH (2014b), we assume the following levels of pure alcohol for each
beverage category: 86.9 g pure alcohol per liter for wine, 37.9 g pure alcohol per liter
for beer, and 316.0 g pure alcohol per liter for spirits. We calculated the amount of
pure alcohol bought per month for every household based on data from the household
expenditure survey. We divided the total amount of pure alcohol by the adult
equivalent for every householdb and classified the households according to the class
boundaries (Table 1) based on Annaheim and Gmel’s recommendations (2004).
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present summary statistics for stage 1, stage 2, and the house-
hold characteristics considered in the model. Furthermore, we provide the share of
zero consumption for every product group. Given that some households did not
buy beverages during the collection period, the sample for stage 2 declines to
33,364 households.
As Table 2 demonstrates, Swiss households spend only 1.4% of their budget on
beverages, with 0.8% on alcoholic beverages and 0.7% on non-alcoholic beverages
(Table 3). This is much lower than the European Union average values of about 1.5%
and 1.2% of household budgets spent on alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages,
respectively (Eurostat 2013). Within alcoholic beverages, the highest share of the Swiss
budget is spent on wine, followed by spirits and then beer. Table 3 clearly delineates
the differences among the three household segments. Moderate drinking households
spend on average four to five times more on wine, beer, or spirits than light drinking
households, whereas heavy drinking households spend about twice as much or more in
comparison to moderate drinking households. On average, the light drinking household
consumes 49.3 g of pure alcohol per month, the moderate drinking household 864.5 g,
and the heavy drinking household consume 1890.0 g.
The share of zero consumption is a point of particular interest. Zero consumption
means that the left side of equation (4) (budget share) is left censored at zero in the
case of demand systems. Besides a short collection period, which may play a special
role in the context of beverages, there are other determinants for zero consumption
like income restrictions that force households into a corner solution or forgoingTable 1 Class boundaries in pure alcohol per person and day




Table 2 Summary statistics for the stage 1 model, total number of households and
expenditure per month
Total number of households 34,176
Mean Standard deviation Percentage of zero
consumption
Total expenditure (in Swiss Francs) 8,432.70 5,132.24 0.00
Expenditure on food (in Swiss Francs) 616.63 354.78 0.14
Expenditure on beverages (in Swiss Francs) 121.63 186.97 2.38
All other expenditure (in Swiss Francs) 1395.42 4933.60 0.00
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aggregated level (stage 1), zero consumption is low, but at the stage 2 level, a large
proportion of households did not consume at all during the collection period. This
has serious implications for the model specification. Censoring of the expenditure data
should therefore be considered, in particular at stage 2, to avoid biased parameter
estimates.
Quality-adjusted prices
Only a few household expenditure surveys collect price data. In the literature, there are
two main methods for retrieving price data from expenditure and quantity variables:
using unit values as proxy for market prices, as Abdulai (2002) or Akbay et al. (2007)
did by dividing the expenditure by the quantity consumed. The other method of
quality-adjusted unit values was originally introduced by Cox and Wohlgenant (1986)
and is frequently applied in the literature (e.g., in Lazaridis 2003; Thiele 2010; Zheng
and Henneberry 2010). Despite the nomenclature, unit values still have a quality aspect,
because of the heterogeneity of products within a given category (e.g., wine). The
consumer can select between different quality levels, leading to different unit values
among households; differences in unit values can be attributed to quality and price
variations (Chung et al. 2005). An increase in the unit value could be induced by a
price increase or by a shift in the household’s demand for more expensive products
within this particular product category. Thus, taking unit values as proxies for market
prices could lead to biased parameter estimates. This is particularly true for composite
commodities (Chung et al. 2005), such as the beverage product groups used in this
study, which contain products of varying qualities. As McKelvey (2011) notes, unit
values will be an “error-ridden indicator of prices”.
Cox and Wohlgenant (1986) proposed correcting the unit value for every household
and product group by regressing proxies for quality variations (e.g., education or house-
hold size) on the unit value. This leads to quality-adjusted prices that vary between
household. Majumder et al. (2012) criticized this approach, stating that households
should face the same price at least in the same regional market and proposed a new
method to calculate quality-adjusted prices per region. Aepli and Finger (2013)
expanded it by a variable for month and year and adapted it for the Swiss household
expenditure survey.
We give a short overview of the method (for further details, see Majumder et al.
(2012) and Aepli and Finger (2013)). As noted in Majumder et al. (2012), household
characteristics and income are good proxies for quality preferences. For instance,































Number of households 33,364 25,699 4,152 3,513
Expenditure on beverages
(in Swiss Francs)
124.59 188.25 2.38 79.28 69.85 192.70 128.76 375.54 444.81
Expenditure on alcoholic
beverages (in Swiss Francs)




57.02 53.95 1.61 55.35 53.30 61.45 53.57 64.03 58.19
Wine (in Swiss Francs) 48.31 162.57 49.10 15.57 34.37 91.17 114.12 237.16 425.85
Beer (in Swiss Francs) 8.23 20.55 69.52 4.36 11.18 17.23 26.65 25.87 41.73
Spirits, sweet wines,
etc. (in Swiss Francs)
11.03 32.44 71.33 4.00 13.47 22.85 34.81 48.48 72.84
Coffee (in Swiss Francs) 14.46 31.21 44.66 13.49 30.03 17.23 31.81 18.32 37.81
Tea (in Swiss Francs) 3.87 8.83 59.92 3.91 9.09 3.88 7.76 3.57 8.05
Cocoa beverages
(in Swiss Francs)
1.92 6.36 85.05 2.03 6.61 1.64 5.45 1.48 5.45
Mineral water
(in Swiss Francs)
10.89 19.33 39.88 10.33 19.17 12.46 19.28 13.10 20.26
Non-alcoholic soft
drinks (in Swiss Francs)
15.87 25.01 32.62 15.67 24.64 16.17 25.77 17.02 26.68
Fruit juices and vegetable
juices (in Swiss Francs)

















Table 4 Summary statistics for the household characteristics
Household characteristics Mean Standard deviation
Household size in adult equivalents 1.63 0.52
Young children (<5 years, yes or no) 0.14 0.35
Age of the household’s reference person 49.69 15.22
University degree with respect to the household’s reference person (yes or no) 0.13 1.27
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group. A separate regression is run for each product category i. Following Aepli and














where νhlymi is the unit value paid by household h for item i in its region l, year y, and
month m. The deviation of the household’s unit value from the median is explained by
household characteristics, income, and expenditure variables, which capture the quality
effect. The part of the deviation that cannot be explained by quality is captured by the
error term εhlymi . Furthermore, x denotes income and x
2 the square of income, e is the
household total expenditure for beverages, and f is the household total expenditure for
food and beverages consumed away from home. Zij denotes the j th of n household
characteristics, which are household size, a binary dummy variable for having children,
and a dummy variable for having a university degree. Dl, Dy, and Dm are dummies
for region, year, and month, respectively. To manage possible outliers more suc-
cessfully, we decided to follow the suggestions in Aepli and Finger (2013) and to
estimate the equations using a robust M-estimator using only those households
that consumed the good.
To obtain regional, monthly, and yearly quality adjusted market prices plmyi we add
the median unit value νlymi median to the corresponding median of item i of the











The prices are then assigned to all households in the sample according to region,month, and year. Due to a low number of households consuming tea and cocoa
beverages in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland in some months, we took the
corresponding consumer price index for those product categories, as well as for all
product categories at stage 1.
Estimation procedure and elasticity calculation
Censoring
Table 3 shows that the share of zero consumption is relatively high for all beverage
product categories at stage 2. This fact has some major consequences on the estimation
procedure and must be taken into account to avoid self-selection and resulting biased
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only allows for estimating conditional effects. The most popular model for coping with
censored data is the Tobit approach (Tobin 1958; Amemiya 1984), which is widely used
for single-equation demand models. Heien and Wessels (1990) proposed a new approach
for equation systems based on Heckman (1979) (for its application see e.g., Dey et al.
2011; Lazaridis 2003). Their approach was criticized by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) and
later by Vermeulen (2001), who showed that the revised procedure leads to inconsistent
estimates. As an alternative, Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) proposed another frequently used
approach (e.g., in Thiele 2008; Su and Yen 2000; Zheng and Henneberry 2011; for wine
in particular, see e.g., Stasi et al. 2011) that is applied in this study.
In the first step, a multivariate probit is estimated (unlike Shonkwiler and Yen (1999),
who estimated a univariate probit). We suppose that one household’s purchase of a
particular beverage product category is not independent of purchase decisions for other
beverage product categories due to substitution effects. The model to be estimated is:
wi ¼ f xijβij
 
þ εi; gi ¼ z0ikγ ik þ νi i ¼ 1;…; n i ¼ 1;…; m k ¼ 1;…; f ð11Þ
gi ¼
0 if gi ≤ 0
1 if gi > 0
wi ¼ giwi i ¼ 1;…; n

ð12Þ
where wi and gi are the observed dependent variables for the food product groups, gi
and wi are the correspondent latent variables, gi is a binary variable representing the
decision of the household to consume or not, and xij and z ' ik are explanatory variables
such as income, logarithmic prices, and household characteristics. All these variables
are presumed to be important determinants with respect to the decision of the
household to consume or not (in this context we refer also to Thiele 2008 and Zheng
and Henneberry 2011). The error terms εi and νi are assumed to have a multivariate
normal distribution, each with a mean of zero and a variance-covariance matrix V with
diagonal elements of 1 and off-diagonal elements of ρrl = ρlr.
Based on the estimated parameters, we calculate the standard normal cumulative
distribution function Φ( ) (cdf ) and the standard normal probability density func-
tion ϕ( ) (pdf ) for every household and each product category; cdf and pdf are
used to correct the budget share equation (4) for a censoring of the budget share
variables as follows:




þ δiϕ z0ikγ ik
 	þ εi; εi eMVN 0; σð Þ i ¼ 1;…; n ð13Þ
Following Zheng and Henneberry (2010), the parameter for the pdf δi represents the co-variance between the error term in the budget share equation (4) and the error term of
the multivariate probit model. Equation (13) is applied only to stage 2. At stage 1, there is
no need for the two-step estimation procedure due to the low level of zero consumption.
We dropped the equation for expenditure on other products and services as described in
Section Theoretical framework of the QUAIDS. For the two-step estimation procedure,
the right hand side generally no longer adds up to one, so we estimate the full equation
system following Yen et al. (2002) or Ecker and Qaim (2010)d.
Despite the advantages of Shonkwiler and Yen’s (1999) procedure, Tauchmann (2005)
draws attention to the problem of heteroscedasticity. By expanding the budget
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model (for further explanations, see Tauchmann 2005). To avoid this problem and to esti-
mate a heteroscedasticity robust covariance matrix, we apply the parametric bootstrap.
Expenditure endogeneity
Assuming weak separability and applying a two-stage budgeting model could lead to
problems with respect to the endogeneity of the expenditure variable in the budget
share equation, because the expenditure variable could be correlated with the equation
errors (Attfield 1985). To account for endogeneity, Blundell and Robin (1999) proposed
the augmented regression technique. In a first step, we regress all the price variables,
the household characteristics, and the variable for month and year of the budget share
equation on the expenditure variable for every product category. On the right hand
side, we further include income and its square as instruments as proposed by Bopape
(2006). In contrast to other studies, where the equations are estimated using OLS
(e.g., Fashogbon and Oni 2013), we use a robust M-estimator to account for
possible outliers. Residuals are then included in every budget share equation as
additional right hand side variables. Testing the parameter of the residuals for
significance allows us to check whether endogeneity is present or not.
Elasticity estimates








which reduces to ei ¼ μiwi þ 1 (Banks et al. 1997) for stage 1, where μi is the differentiation
of equation (4) with respect to log me. For the Marshallian price elasticity εMij , we follow
Zheng and Henneberry (2010) and calculate the full effect of a price change on demand
based on the effect of the budget share equation and the effect of the multivariate probit










where μij is the differentiation of equation (4) with respect to log pj.
f τij is the
estimated parameter for price j with respect to product category i in the multivariate
probit model and δi is defined as above. δij denotes the Kronecker delta, which is equal
to one when i = j and otherwise is zero. For stage 1, the formula for the Marshallian




The Slutsky equation is applied to get the Hicksian price elasticities:
eHij ¼ eMij þ eiwj ð16Þ
For stage 2, we first estimate conditional elasticities with respect to total expenditureson beverages. Unconditional elasticities are derived following Edgerton (1997). The
formula for the income elasticity (unconditional) ei
uc is:
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uc ¼ e rð Þic  e rð Þuc ð17Þ
where e(r)i
c is the expenditure elasticity (conditional) for item i within the r th product
group and e(r)
uc the income elasticity for the r th product group (unconditional). The
unconditional Marshallian price elasticity εM; ucij is calculated by:
εM; ucij ¼ εH ; crð Þij þ e rð Þic  w rð ÞjεrrM; uc ð18Þ
where εH ; crð Þij is the conditional Marshallian price elasticity for item i and j, w(r)j the
budget share of item j within the r th product category, and εrr
M,uc the uncompensated
Hicksian own-price elasticity of product category r.
The unconditional, Hicksian price elasticity εH ; ucij is derived analogously using ε
H ; c
rð Þij
and the Hicksian own-price elasticity (unconditional) of product category r εrr
H,uc:
εH; ucij ¼ εH ; crð Þij þ e rð Þic  w rð ÞjεrrH;uc ð19Þ
Results and discussion
Overall, the variables in the model explain between 0.47% and 0.86% of total variance
at stage 1 and between 0.06% and 0.80% of total variance at stage 2. For the sake of
brevity, we report the parameter estimates of stages 1 and 2, the coefficients of deter-
mination, and Χ2 -test statistics for the entire model in the Additional file 1: Appendix.
While prices and socio-demographic variables do explain a part of the variance in
consumption, the rest is determined by other factors such as lifestyle or psychographic
or behavioral aspects, which are not considered further in this study (for determinants
of Swiss wine demand see e.g., Brunner and Siegrist 2011). While household size is
mostly negatively correlated with budget share, the age of the households’ reference
person shows a positive correlation which is in line with the findings of previous
studies. For the presence of young children and education, we could not show a clear
relationship with respect to the budget share. The sign of the parameters varies
depending on the household segment.
To verify the model specification with respect to the implementation of household
characteristics and the quadratic income term, we carried out Wald-tests for every
model. The test statistics reject clearly the null-hypothesis of no household characteristics
for all models (Additional file 1: Appendix), which can also be derived from the estimation
results for the parameter estimates in Tables 24 to 28 (in the Additional file 1: Appendix).
The hypothesis that Engel curves for beverages in Switzerland are often of a nonlinear
form is supported by the test results. The QUAIDS specification is therefore superior to
the AIDS specification for stage 1 and stage 2, except for the models for light drinking
and moderate drinking households (Additional file 1: Appendix). These findings are con-
sistent with other findings for food demand in Switzerland (Abdulai 2002; Aepli and
Kuhlgatz 2014). Furthermore, we tested for endogeneity of the expenditure variable in the
model. The hypothesis of no endogeneity is clearly rejected for all models and confirms
the importance of a correction for endogeneity (Additional file 1: Appendix), which we
achieved by applying the augmented regression technique.
Unconditional Hicksian price and income elasticities for beverages are reported in
Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 for all households and the three segments. We provide
Table 5 Unconditional, Marshallian price and income elasticities at stage 2, all households (at sample means)
Win Bee Sp Cof Tea CBe MWa NaS FJVJ Income
Wine −0.986 (0.208)*** −0.177 (0.142) 0.046 (0.097) −0.141 (0.181) −1.328 (0.325)*** 0.353 (0.248) 0.354 (0.203) −0.256 (0.296) 0.054 (0.135) 1.288 (0.182)***
Beer 0.188 (0.139) −0.634 (0.242)*** 0.100 (0.093) 0.153 (0.112) 0.571 (0.260)** −1.260 (0.238)*** −1.036 (0.180)*** 0.002 (0.109) 0.296 (0.153)* 0.096 (0.085)
Spirits 0.397 (0.146)*** −0.164 (0.072)** −0.950 (0.043)*** −0.082 (0.122) 0.565 (0.357) 0.519 (0.215)** 0.132 (0.116) −0.070 (0.209) 0.003 (0.069) 0.918 (0.101)***
Coffee 0.055 (0.088) 0.185 (0.084)** 0.098 (0.077) −0.786 (0.081)*** −2.436 (0.256)*** −1.508 (0.158)*** −0.320 (0.136)** −0.126 (0.110) 0.172 (0.079)** 0.350 (0.132)***
Tea −0.157 (0.114) 0.007 (0.108) −0.030 (0.089) −0.143 (0.128) −4.638 (0.506)*** −2.442 (0.294)*** 0.300 (0.218) −0.045 (0.180) 0.030 (0.097) 0.419 (0.160)***
Cocoa
beverages
0.443 (0.242)* −0.593 (0.219)** −0.138 (0.100) 0.028 (0.207) −3.365 (0.679)*** −0.753 (0.484) 1.175 (0.236)*** −0.305 (0.330) −0.267 (0.167) 1.441 (0.106)***
Mineral water −0.068 (0.182) −0.416 (0.115)*** −0.106 (0.066) 0.016 (0.166) −2.969 (0.273)*** −0.064 (0.229) −0.186 (0.148) −0.213 (0.262) 0.058 (0.110) 1.156 (0.107)***
Non-alcoholic
soft drinks




0.033 (0.073) 0.318 (0.109)*** 0.164 (0.046)*** −0.253 (0.074)*** −1.933 (0.210)*** −1.279 (0.167)*** −0.745 (0.124)*** −0.053 (0.101) −0.757 (0.086)*** 0.363 (0.057)***
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

















Table 6 Unconditional, Hicksian price and income elasticities at stage 2, all households (at sample means)
Win Bee Sp Cof Tea CBe MWa NaS FJVJ Income
Wine −0.983 (0.208)*** −0.176 (0.142) 0.046 (0.097) −0.138 (0.181) −1.324 (0.325)*** 0.356 (0.248) 0.355 (0.203)* −0.252 (0.295) 0.055 (0.135) 1.288 (0.182)***
Beer 0.188 (0.139) −0.634 (0.242)*** 0.100 (0.093) 0.153 (0.112) 0.571 (0.260)** −1.260 (0.238)*** −1.036 (0.180)*** 0.002 (0.109) 0.296 (0.153)* 0.096 (0.085)
Spirits 0.399 (0.146)*** −0.163 (0.072)** −0.950 (0.043)*** −0.080 (0.122) 0.567 (0.357) 0.520 (0.215)** 0.133 (0.116) −0.067 (0.209) 0.004 (0.069) 0.918 (0.101)***
Coffee 0.056 (0.088) 0.185 (0.084)** 0.098 (0.077) −0.785 (0.081)*** −2.435 (0.256)*** −1.507 (0.158)*** −0.320 (0.136)** −0.125 (0.110) 0.172 (0.079)** 0.350 (0.132)***
Tea −0.156 (0.113) 0.008 (0.108) −0.030 (0.089) −0.142 (0.128) −4.637 (0.506)*** −2.442 (0.294)*** 0.300 (0.218) −0.044 (0.180) 0.031 (0.097) 0.419 (0.160)***
Cocoa
beverages
0.446 (0.242)* −0.592 (0.219)*** −0.138 (0.100) 0.031 (0.207) −3.361 (0.679)*** −0.751 (0.484) 1.176 (0.236)*** −0.300 (0.330) −0.266 (0.167) 1.441 (0.106)***
Mineral water −0.066 (0.182) −0.415 (0.115)*** −0.106 (0.066) 0.018 (0.166) −2.966 (0.273)*** −0.062 (0.229) −0.185 (0.148) −0.209 (0.262) 0.059 (0.109) 1.156 (0.107)***
Non-alcoholic
soft drinks




0.034 (0.073) 0.318 (0.109)*** 0.164 (0.046)*** −0.252 (0.074)*** −1.932 (0.210)*** −1.278 (0.167)*** −0.744 (0.124)*** −0.052 (0.101) −0.757 (0.086)*** 0.363 (0.057)***
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

















Table 7 Unconditional, Marshallian price and income elasticities at stage 2, light drinking households (at sample means)
Win Bee Sp Cof Tea CBe MWa NaS FJVJ Income
Wine −1.275 (0.247)*** −0.144 (0.141) 0.038 (0.203) −0.156 (0.161) −0.801 (1.050) 0.172 (0.718) 0.450 (0.348) −0.484 (0.177)*** 0.003 (0.595) 0.620 (0.366)*
Beer 0.679 (0.707) −1.216 (0.457)*** 0.000 (0.265) 0.550 (0.226)** −1.892 (2.355) −2.940 (1.576)* −1.056 (1.363) 0.480 (0.545) 1.082 (0.874) 0.469 (0.534)
Spirits 0.363 (0.400) −0.011 (0.151) −0.859 (0.220)*** 0.109 (0.152) 2.874 (1.163)** 0.317 (1.276) −0.760 (0.730) 0.429 (0.235)* 0.417 (0.703) 0.666 (0.408)
Coffee 0.365 (0.348) 0.165 (0.151) 0.036 (0.163) −0.729 (0.134)*** −3.209 (1.311)** −1.825 (0.721)** −0.431 (0.667) 0.192 (0.240) 0.708 (0.527) 0.569 (0.307)*
Tea −1.000 (0.580)* −0.438 (0.245)* −0.070 (0.430) −0.606 (0.297)** −4.656 (2.844) −0.586 (1.466) 2.528 (1.147)** −0.721 (0.343)** −1.146 (1.403) 0.875 (0.845)
Cocoa
beverages
0.635 (0.564) −0.332 (0.627) 0.014 (0.403) −0.006 (0.446) −4.249 (1.628)*** −1.244 (1.244) −0.807 (0.915) 0.375 (0.610) −0.574 (0.825) 1.489 (0.668)**
Mineral water −0.193 (0.831) −0.854 (0.670) −0.099 (0.316) −0.710 (0.445) −6.929 (2.611)*** 0.722 (1.186) 0.490 (1.599) −0.193 (0.653) −1.239 (0.819) 2.068 (0.403)***
Non-alcoholic
soft drinks




0.171 (0.275) 0.388 (0.273) 0.111 (0.163) 0.025 (0.138) −0.812 (1.077) −1.558 (0.458)*** −0.262 (0.753) 0.025 (0.251) −0.206 (0.465) 0.220 (0.248)
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

















Table 8 Unconditional, Hicksian price and income elasticities at stage 2, light drinking households (at sample means)
Win Bee Sp Cof Tea CBe MWa NaS FJVJ Income
Wine −1.273 (0.246)*** −0.143 (0.141) 0.039 (0.203) −0.155 (0.161) −0.799 (1.049) 0.174 (0.718) 0.450 (0.348) −0.483 (0.176)*** 0.004 (0.595) 0.620 (0.366)*
Beer 0.680 (0.707) −1.216 (0.457)*** 0.001 (0.265) 0.551 (0.225)** −1.890 (2.355) −2.938 (1.576)* −1.056 (1.363) 0.480 (0.545) 1.082 (0.874) 0.469 (0.534)
Spirits 0.365 (0.400) −0.010 (0.151) −0.858 (0.220)*** 0.111 (0.152) 2.877 (1.163)** 0.319 (1.276) −0.760 (0.730) 0.430 (0.235)* 0.417 (0.703) 0.666 (0.408)
Coffee 0.367 (0.347) 0.165 (0.151) 0.036 (0.163) −0.728 (0.133)*** −3.207 (1.311)** −1.823 (0.721)** −0.431 (0.667) 0.193 (0.240) 0.708 (0.527) 0.569 (0.307)*
Tea −0.998 (0.579)* −0.437 (0.245)* −0.070 (0.430) −0.604 (0.296)** −4.653 (2.843) −0.584 (1.466) 2.529 (1.147)** −0.720 (0.342)** −1.146 (1.403) 0.875 (0.845)
Cocoa
beverages
0.639 (0.564) −0.330 (0.627) 0.014 (0.403) −0.003 (0.446) −4.244 (1.627)*** −1.240 (1.244) −0.806 (0.915) 0.377 (0.609) −0.573 (0.825) 1.489 (0.668)**
Mineral water −0.188 (0.831) −0.852 (0.670) −0.098 (0.316) −0.705 (0.445) −6.923 (2.611)*** 0.727 (1.186) 0.491 (1.599) −0.189 (0.653) −1.238 (0.819) 2.068 (0.403)***
Non-alcoholic
soft drinks




0.171 (0.275) 0.388 (0.273) 0.112 (0.163) 0.026 (0.137) −0.812 (1.077) −1.558 (0.458)*** −0.262 (0.753) 0.026 (0.251) −0.206 (0.465) 0.220 (0.248)
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

















Table 9 Unconditional, Marshallian price and income elasticities at stage 2, moderate drinking households (at sample means)
Win Bee Sp Cof Tea CBe MWa NaS FJVJ Income
Wine −0.665 (1.419) 0.194 (1.155) 0.236 (0.606) −0.029 (0.554) 0.186 (0.614) −0.183 (0.548) −0.362 (0.450) −0.562 (0.563) −0.088 (0.232) 1.077 (0.355) ***
Beer 0.639 (1.230) −0.825 (1.186) 0.365 (0.535) −0.049 (0.699) 1.096 (1.289) −0.893 (0.554) −0.301 (0.450) −0.317 (0.704) −0.137 (0.266) 0.877 (0.867)
Spirits 0.305 (0.954) 0.166 (0.453) −0.799 (0.351)** −0.093 (0.249) −0.877 (0.514)* −0.479 (0.304) −0.143 (0.310) −0.423 (0.390) −0.144 (0.145) 0.636 (0.355) *
Coffee 0.034 (1.414) 0.015 (1.579) 0.077 (0.686) −0.828 (0.611) −1.718 (1.648) −0.250 (1.180) 0.173 (0.473) −0.096 (0.479) 0.105 (0.361) 0.058 (0.436)
Tea 0.264 (2.398) 0.005 (1.583) 0.043 (0.960) −0.237 (0.757) −1.360 (1.488) −1.367 (1.008) 0.524 (0.685) 0.069 (0.714) −0.170 (0.403) 0.241 (0.613)
Cocoa
beverages
0.337 (2.472) −1.143 (2.480) −0.097 (1.039) −0.063 (1.441) −2.195 (3.197) 1.858 (3.379) −0.087 (1.077) −0.129 (1.496) 0.389 (0.857) −0.186 (1.539)
Mineral water −0.293 (1.706) −0.021 (0.873) −0.033 (0.561) −0.212 (0.523) −0.716 (0.757) −0.136 (0.620) −0.512 (1.234) −0.211 (0.704) 0.316 (0.563) 0.632 (0.509)
Non-alcoholic
soft drinks




0.362 (0.973) −0.058 (0.937) 0.007 (0.384) −0.041 (0.452) −2.267 (0.857)*** 0.265 (0.457) 0.175 (0.638) −0.419 (0.417) −0.947 (0.356)*** 0.503 (0.329)
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

















Table 10 Unconditional, Hicksian price and income elasticities at stage 2, moderate drinking households (at sample means)
Win Bee Sp Cof Tea CBe MWa NaS FJVJ Income
Wine −0.663 (1.419) 0.194 (1.155) 0.236 (0.606) −0.028 (0.554) 0.188 (0.614) −0.182 (0.548) −0.360 (0.450) −0.556 (0.563) −0.087 (0.232) 1.077 (0.355)***
Beer 0.640 (1.230) −0.825 (1.186) 0.365 (0.535) −0.048 (0.699) 1.098 (1.289) −0.892 (0.554) −0.299 (0.449) −0.312 (0.701) −0.135 (0.265) 0.877 (0.867)
Spirits 0.306 (0.954) 0.166 (0.453) −0.799 (0.351)** −0.093 (0.249) −0.876 (0.514)* −0.479 (0.304) −0.141 (0.310) −0.420 (0.389) −0.143 (0.145) 0.636 (0.355)*
Coffee 0.034 (1.414) 0.015 (1.579) 0.077 (0.686) −0.828 (0.611) −1.717 (1.648) −0.250 (1.180) 0.173 (0.473) −0.095 (0.478) 0.105 (0.361) 0.058 (0.436)
Tea 0.265 (2.398) 0.006 (1.583) 0.043 (0.960) −0.237 (0.757) −1.360 (1.488) −1.367 (1.008) 0.525 (0.685) 0.070 (0.712) −0.170 (0.402) 0.241 (0.613)
Cocoa
beverages
0.336 (2.472) −1.143 (2.480) −0.097 (1.039) −0.063 (1.441) −2.195 (3.197) 1.857 (3.378) −0.088 (1.076) −0.130 (1.491) 0.389 (0.856) −0.186 (1.539)
Mineral water −0.292 (1.706) −0.021 (0.873) −0.033 (0.561) −0.212 (0.523) −0.715 (0.757) −0.135 (0.620) −0.511 (1.233) −0.207 (0.703) 0.317 (0.563) 0.632 (0.509)
Non-alcoholic
soft drinks




0.362 (0.973) −0.057 (0.937) 0.007 (0.384) −0.040 (0.452) −2.266 (0.857)*** 0.265 (0.457) 0.176 (0.638) −0.416 (0.416) −0.947 (0.356)*** 0.503 (0.329)
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

















Table 11 Unconditional, Marshallian price and income elasticities at stage 2, heavy drinking households (at sample means)
Win Bee Sp Cof Tea CBe MWa NaS FJVJ Income
Wine −0.519 (0.319) 0.573 (0.557) 0.251 (0.204) 0.178 (0.119) 1.533 (1.075) −1.456 (0.803)* −0.641 (0.295)** −0.673 (0.516) 0.543 (0.325)* 1.009 (0.172)***
Beer 0.800 (1.210) −0.244 (2.026) 0.289 (0.671) 0.498 (0.604) 4.057 (5.212) −3.259 (4.122) −1.306 (1.427) −0.684 (0.987) 1.419 (1.960) 1.412 (0.768)**
Spirits 0.336 (0.512) −0.684 (0.897) −0.919 (0.315)*** −0.260 (0.221) −3.335 (1.771)* 1.735 (1.339) 0.494 (0.451) −0.284 (0.372) −1.095 (0.566)* 0.357 (0.240)
Coffee 0.066 (0.451) −0.451 (0.819) 0.237 (0.275) −0.997 (0.318)*** −3.220 (2.295) 1.173 (1.721) 0.408 (0.586) −0.296 (0.402) −0.898 (0.855) 0.488 (0.338)
Tea 0.230 (0.830) −1.307 (1.232) 0.199 (0.522) −0.319 (0.416) −2.582 (3.903) 3.393 (2.865) 1.149 (0.799) −0.631 (0.674) −0.859 (1.050) 0.258 (0.503)
Cocoa
beverages
0.131 (0.873) −0.429 (1.159) 0.100 (0.569) −0.285 (0.655) −6.955 (5.165) −1.639 (3.760) 0.055 (1.388) −0.274 (0.790) −0.864 (2.016) 0.426 (0.634)
Mineral water 0.079 (0.468) −0.442 (0.783) −0.055 (0.343) −0.374 (0.457) −2.208 (2.190) 1.556 (1.655) −0.686 (0.775) −0.591 (0.491) 0.007 (1.110) 0.398 (0.350)
Non-alcoholic
soft drinks
0.483 (0.545) −0.193 (1.027) 0.069 (0.333) −0.255 (0.329) −2.633 (2.429) 1.908 (1.947) 0.308 (0.649) −1.702 (0.421)*** −0.931 (0.951) 0.389 (0.378)
Fruit juices and
vegetables juices
0.233 (0.826) −0.969 (1.339) −0.082 (0.410) −0.691 (0.622) −2.330 (3.855) 1.553 (3.069) 1.517 (1.340) −0.160 (0.623) −2.154 (1.735) 0.395 (0.601)
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

















Table 12 Unconditional, Hicksian price and income elasticities at stage 2, heavy drinking households (at sample means)
Win Bee Sp Cof Tea CBe MWa NaS FJVJ Income
Wine −0.518 (0.319) 0.574 (0.557) 0.251 (0.204) 0.179 (0.119) 1.535 (1.075) −1.455 (0.803)** −0.639 (0.295)** −0.666 (0.516) 0.545 (0.325)* 1.009 (0.172)***
Beer 0.801 (1.210) −0.244 (2.026) 0.289 (0.671) 0.499 (0.604) 4.059 (5.212) −3.258 (4.122) −1.303 (1.426) −0.674 (0.984) 1.420 (1.960) 1.412 (0.768)**
Spirits 0.337 (0.512) −0.684 (0.897) −0.919 (0.315) *** −0.260 (0.221) −3.334 (1.771)* 1.735 (1.339) 0.495 (0.451) −0.281 (0.371) −1.094 (0.566)* 0.357 (0.240)
Coffee 0.067 (0.451) −0.451 (0.819) 0.237 (0.275) −0.996 (0.318)*** −3.219 (2.295) 1.173 (1.721) 0.409 (0.586) −0.292 (0.400) −0.897 (0.855) 0.488 (0.338)
Tea 0.231 (0.830) −1.307 (1.232) 0.199 (0.522) −0.319 (0.416) −2.582 (3.903) 3.393 (2.865) 1.150 (0.799) −0.629 (0.671) −0.859 (1.050) 0.258 (0.503)
Cocoa
beverages
0.131 (0.873) −0.429 (1.159) 0.100 (0.569) −0.284 (0.655) −6.954 (5.165) −1.639 (3.760) 0.056 (1.388) −0.271 (0.787) −0.863 (2.016) 0.426 (0.634)
Mineral water 0.079 (0.468) −0.442 (0.783) −0.055 (0.343) −0.373 (0.457) −2.207 (2.190) 1.556 (1.655) −0.685 (0.775) −0.588 (0.489) 0.007 (1.110) 0.398 (0.350)
Non-alcoholic
soft drinks
0.484 (0.545) −0.193 (1.027) 0.069 (0.333) −0.255 (0.329) −2.633 (2.429) 1.908 (1.947) 0.309 (0.649) −1.699 (0.419)*** −0.931 (0.951) 0.389 (0.378)
Fruit juices and
vegetables juices
0.234 (0.826) −0.969 (1.339) −0.082 (0.410) −0.691 (0.622) −2.330 (3.855) 1.553 (3.069) 1.518 (1.340) −0.157 (0.620) −2.154 (1.735) 0.395 (0.601)
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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cussed in Oehlert (1992). We provide the conditional elasticities for stage 2 in the Additional
file 1: Appendix. The elasticities for stage 1 can be obtained from the author on request.
General price and income responses for beverages and for the three household
segments are discussed in terms of elasticities. Due to the cross-sectional structure of
the data set, elasticities should be interpreted as short-term reactions of households to
price and income changes.
Income elasticities for alcoholic beverages are all positive in the model for all house-
holds. Wine is found to be a luxury good and spirits and beer are found to be necessity
goods, though spirits is very closed to the luxury goods. The findings for beer are in
line with previous studies (see e.g. Nelson 1997 and Selvanathan and Selvanathan
2005). With respect to wine and spirits the findings in the literature are partially
contradictory. In most studies wine and spirits are found to be luxury goods or have
an elasticity which is smaller but close to one (Fogarty 2008). Therefore our findings
are in the range of variability of the results of previous studies.
Looking at the income elasticities of the three segments, alcoholic beverages are a neces-
sity good for light drinking households, as well as for moderate drinking households, ex-
cept for wine. For heavy drinking households, beer and wine are luxury goods, while spirits
are necessity goodsg. Light drinking households are clearly less income-elastic for wine and
beer than moderate and heavy drinking households, and heavy drinking households are
much more income-elastic with respect to beer than moderate drinking households.
Almost all own-price elasticities for alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages are negative
for the three household segments as well as for the model with all households. Therefore,
the negativity condition is mostly fulfilled. For wine and beer, our findings show a clear de-
crease in the magnitude from light drinking households to heavy drinking households.
Looking at the Hicksian demand elasticities, an additional 1% decrease in beer price would
result in an increase of the light drinking household demand by 1.21%, while moderate
drinking households would increase their consumption by 0.83% and heavy drinking
households even less by 0.24%. This shows that light drinking households are relatively
price elastic while heavy drinking households are inelastic. Beer is of special interest be-
cause it is the favorite beverage for young people in Switzerland. A recently study published
by Dey et al. (2013) shows that those who practice binge drinking or other risky drinking
behavior in Switzerland have a high penchant for beer. The authors (Dey et al. 2013) sug-
gest the relatively low price of beer in comparison to other alcoholic beverages explains
these findings. The price argument likely also applies to middle-aged or older people in
terms of risky drinking behavior and could be a reason why own-price elasticities for
spirits, which are more expensive than beer, are almost constant between the three seg-
ments with a range from 0.83 and 0.92h. These results are in contrast to Kuo et al. (2003),
who found that moderate drinkers show relatively higher price responses than heavy
drinkers in relation to spirits.
Looking at the model for all households, non-alcoholic beverages are mostly substitutes
for wine and beer. In the case of spirits, tea, cocoa beverages, and mineral water are slight
complements, while coffee, non-alcoholic soft drinks, and fruit and vegetables juices are
substitutes. With respect to the substitution effects between alcoholic and non-alcoholic
beverages among the three households segments, we did not find a clear structure. There
are substitutes as well as complementary goods depending on the household segment.
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negative except for mineral water for light drinking households and cocoa beverages
for moderate drinking households. The magnitude of the Hicksian own-price elastici-
ties shows a tendency for higher price sensitivity from light to heavy drinking house-
holds, indicating that heavy drinking households are price-sensitive to non-alcoholic
beverages in contrast to alcoholic beverages.
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper reports on the income and price elasticities for different alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverage product categories with respect to light, moderate, and heavy drinking
households in Switzerland. It is based on microdata of the Swiss household expenditure
survey from 2000 to 2009, containing data from more than 34,000 households. We ap-
plied a two-stage quadratic almost ideal demand system, correcting for the high share of
zero consumption for some product categories at stage 2 and for endogeneity of the ex-
penditure variable. Missing price data were received by adjusting unit values for quality as
recently proposed by Aepli and Finger (2013) and Majumder et al. (2012). We tested the
model specification with respect to household characteristics as well as the quadratic in-
come term, which distinguishes the QUAIDS from the AIDS. Testing for the overall sig-
nificance of the household characteristics and the quadratic income terms confirms the
model specification. With respect to wine and beer, moderate and heavy drinking house-
holds are less price-sensitive than light drinking households are, while for spirits we did
not find a difference among the three household segments.
Our findings have major policy implications with respect to the alcohol tax. In general,
the higher the negative effects of alcohol consumption and the lower the elasticity, the
higher the tax should be set and vice versa. This only holds if we assume a constant elasti-
city function. By dividing the sample into three segments, we have shown that this does
not hold for Swiss households and heavy drinking households are less price-sensitive, in
particular with respect to wine and beer, than moderate or light drinking households. To
fix the optimal level of a tax on alcohol, the different responses of households to price
changes should be considered. As already noted by Manning et al. (1995), the optimal level
for an alcohol tax is a trade-off between economic, public health, and social gains due to a
reduction in consumption of heavy drinkers and the possible adverse social or even
health effectsi on light or moderate drinkers due to the additional tax burden. Our
findings clearly show that the assumption of a constant elasticity function with re-
spect to the three defined segments is violated and that households do not respond
similarly to price changes in wine and beer. A tax on those products will therefore
lead to a decrease in consumption, especially in light drinking households, and to
a lesser extent in moderate drinking households. The effect on heavy drinking house-
holds is minimal. From a social and health perspective, this may not be a desirable devel-
opment. Therefore, before implementing a new tax on alcoholic beverages in Switzerland
or in other European countries, the social and health externality costs and the economic
effects of a rather small decrease in alcohol consumption among heavy drinking house-
holds must be weighed against possible adverse health or economic consequences of a
sharp decline in light or moderate drinking households. To a certain extent, our
findings for Switzerland can be transferred to other high-income countries and
contribute to a differentiated discussion on alcohol tax.
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for further research will be the estimation of elasticities for different household types with
respect to the age of the households’ reference person. As Kuo et al. (2003) has already
noted, the price response for spirits depends on age. While younger or middle-aged people
react more to price changes in spirits, older people are quite inelastic. Our findings show
that households react differently to spirits than to wine and beer. Therefore, the findings of
Kuo et al. (2003) will probably not hold for wine and beer and a further study should shed
valuable light on this question.
Another point of interest is the substitution within a product category, such as shifting
from more expensive alcoholic beverages to cheaper ones of lower quality due to a higher
tax. Although we were not able to show this effect in our analysis, it is possible that people
would buy cheaper products which are likely more risky. Gruenewald et al. (2006) show
that consumers respond to price increases by altering their consumption, varying their
brand choices as well as substituting between quality classes. This finding has consequences
for a tax increase. For example, a tax increase on only high quality alcohol beverages could
lead to substitution towards lower quality products and operate as a positive income effect,
probably associated with higher consumption of alcoholic beverages in total (Gruenewald
et al. 2006). This possibility illustrates the need for research focused on quality substitution.
From a methodological perspective, further research should be conducted on the esti-
mation of price and income for different household segments within a single QUAIDS by
introducing cross-terms into the budget share equation, to estimate possible interaction
effects between household types and price or income parameters.Endnotes
aAfter Klonaris and Hallam (2003) conditional elasticities contain only direct effects
on demand in comparison to unconditional elasticities, which contain direct and indir-
ect effects. The latter are therefore more relevant in welfare analysis and for policy pur-
poses (Klonaris and Hallam 2003). The reason lies in multistage budgeting; a change in
the price for one beverage category at the second stage within beverages (first stage)
has a direct effect on the demand of all beverage categories (second stage) but has also
an effect on the price index for beverages (first stage) and therefore will influence the
allocation at the first stage (beverages and other commodity groups). This could have a
further indirect effect on the demand for beverage categories at the second stage.
bAdult equivalent is a better proxy for the number of alcohol consuming people in a
household than the number of adults because of the relatively high alcohol consumption
among people 15 years old or younger in Switzerland (Annaheim and Gmel 2004).
cShonkwiler and Yen’s (1999) two-step estimation procedure of does not allow for
the incorporation of the adding-up restriction into the model.
dμi≡
∂wi
















fA good is called a luxury good if demand increases more than proportionally as
income rises (ei > 1). If demand increases less than proportionally, the good is called a
necessity good (ei > 1).
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price for wine (10.20 CHF/Liter) or spirits (15.18 CHF/Liter). This supports the
interpretation proposed by Dey et al. (2013) that the low price for beer plays an
important role with respect to drinking behavior.
hThe health effects depend on the assumptions made with respect to low or moderate
alcohol consumption.
iThe reduction in sample size in comparison to Table 1 arises due to the
deletion of households without consumption of beverages during the data collection
period.
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